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Abstract
Profitability and Corporate Social Responsibility
Alexander Kirk

This project examines the relationship between net margins and measures of corporate social
responsibility for the companies in the S&P 500 index. This is conducted through linear
regressions of overall, environmental, social, and governance scores on net margin percentages
for firms from their annual 10-K reports filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The
corporate social responsibility measures were taken from Sustainalytics via Yahoo Finance and
combined with dummy variables for Global Industry Classification Standard sectors. Results
indicate very limited role in corporate social responsibility measures for predicting net margins,
instead favoring sector specific variables as driving net margins to a large degree.
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Introduction
This project will examine the relationship between profit margins, the goal of the
corporation, and how well corporations score on a variety of corporate social responsibility (CSR)
measures. When the first concerted effort for an expanded role and mission for corporations
arose in the late 1960s and early 1970s, legendary economist Milton Friedman took to the
editorial pages of The New York Times in 1970 to forcefully push back on such inclinations,
arguing that anything other than complete deference to shareholders for the goal of maximizing
profit would result in unaccountable executives that would be robbing shareholders and
effectively taxing them (Friedman 1970). Following Friedman 35 years later, The Economist
published a “special report” on the topic of CSR. Published in January 2005, the report
emphasizes the relative ease with which principles of broader social responsibility took hold in
corporate board rooms (2005). Writing with a similar sentiment toward the subject as Friedman,
The Economist pointed out the lack of a counterparty or countermovement to the push for CSR
and the displeasure seen by activists believing that corporations only superficially believed in
social responsibility when it benefited their bottom line (2005). While shareholder primacy
became the corporate philosophy of the day throughout the rest of the twentieth century and
the first decade and a half of the twenty-first, recent years have seen a renewed interest in a
broader set of corporate responsibilities.
The importance of further research on this topic has never been greater, as politicians like
Bernie Sanders, Elizabeth Warren, and others seeking the Democratic Party nomination for the
2020 presidential election have actively promoted regulations that would broaden the
responsibilities of businesses in the United States by bringing terms like “accountable capitalism”

3
and policies like a federal corporate charter from the political left into the political mainstream
(Sen. Warren 2018). For example, Warren’s Accountable Capitalism Act would require that large
corporations acquire a federal charter with the purpose of “creating a general public benefit” and
reserving 40% of board seats for employees (Sen. Warren 2018). While Warren’s bill came
nowhere close to passing, it is still important to understand what effect an increased focus on
corporate social responsibility at the federal level would have on the financial performance of
America’s largest and most successful firms.
In August 2019, a group of 181 chief executive officers of American corporations that are
members of the Business Roundtable lobbying organization signed a letter pledging their firms
to a broader set of corporate responsibilities (Business Roundtable 2019). Particularly, the letter
states that corporations share a “fundamental commitment” to all of their stakeholders, naming
customers, employees, suppliers, communities, and shareholders (Business Roundtable 2019). In
response, The Economist revisited the topic in August 2019 with many of the same arguments as
it had in 2005, plus more on the reliable rates of return that corporations earn for pensions,
endowments, and the like (2019). Additionally, they point out that many of the CEOs that signed
the Business Roundtable letter committing their firms to broader social responsibility helm
companies that effectively operate as oligopolies in their respective industries, giving them a
clear interest in raising the barriers to entry for their sector of the economy (2019).
Literature Review
Shortly after the first Economist report, Husted and Salazar published a microeconomic
theory-based analysis of CSR spending (Husted and Salazar 2006). The authors take Friedman’s
original argument that profits cannot be maximized at the same time as social good and find that
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when firms act strategically in terms of their CSR spending, they can maximize both measures
(Husted and Salazar 2006, 86). However, when coerced by governments, shareholders, or
societal pressure, it can neither maximize profits nor social good (Husted and Salazar 2006, 87).
Siegal and Vitaliano analyzed the relationship between firm performance and whether a
firm engages in CSR (Siegal and Vitaliano 2007). As the research occurred before wider societal
and political pressures for firms to be good corporate citizens, Siegal and Vitaliano only examined
a simple binary in which a firm engages in CSR or it does not (Siegal and Vitaliano 2007, 790).
They found that firms that engage in CSR have higher profits than they would if they did not and
vice versa, lending support to the hypothesis that firms only engage in strategic CSR in a profitmaximizing way (Siegal and Vitaliano 2007, 790). Extending on Siegal and Vitaliano’s research,
Hernández-Murillo and Martinek find that the motivations driving firms to spend on CSR projects
depends heavily on the industry within which the firm operates (Hernández-Murillo and Martinek
2009). For example, manufacturing firms engage in more environmental CSR while service firms
engage in more community and human rights CSR (Hernández-Murillo and Martinek 2009).
On the stakeholder theory side, Hillman and Keim found that firms that invest in nonshareholder stakeholder relationships allows firms to develop intangible, valuable assets that can
be sources of competitive advantage (Hillman and Keim 2001, 135). However, they also find that
using firm resources on social issues that do not affect primary stakeholders is easily imitable and
not a source of sustainable competitive advantage (Hillman and Keim 2001, 135). Choi and Wang
built on that and found that positive stakeholder relations are one of the most consistent sources
of sustained competitive advantage for leading firms (Choi and Wang 2009, 903). Additionally,
they found that poorly performing firms can use improved stakeholder relationships in order to
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return to good financial performance (Choi and Wang 2009, 903). Henisz, Dorobantu, and Nartey
found a positive relationship between increasing stakeholder support and financial valuations in
public markets (Henisz, Dorobantu, and Nartey 2013, 1743). Bettinazzi and Zollo found that
similar positive stakeholder relationships in the acquiring firm leads to success in merger
performance (Bettinazzi and Zollo 2017, 2481).
Empirical Model
The empirical model for this research is a straightforward one, with the goal of
determining whether the extent that firms in engage in CSR is correlated with its traditional
measures of financial performance. Therefore, the baseline regression is the following:
Net Margin = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1Overall + 𝜀
The dependent variable, Net Margin, is a simple calculation of the firm’s bottom line net
income divided by top line revenue. There is a number of reasons for selecting margins as the
independent variable used to measure financial performance, as opposed to stock price or
shareholder returns. First, margins capture consumer behavior on the revenue side and
employee and firm behavior on the costs side. If better social responsibility convinces a potential
customer to pay more for a firm’s product, that would be reflected in higher revenues. Similarly,
if better social responsibility convinced employees to work for the firm at a lower rate than they
would otherwise, the firm can save on costs as well. Using stock prices or shareholder returns
would capture none of the above behaviors, instead reflecting investor behavior that may take a
drastically different approach. Additionally, shareholder returns would capture dividends that
not all firms pay, making it difficult to compare different sized firms and those at different stages
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of maturity. Finally, and on a similar note to the previous, margins allow different sized firms to
be compared in a way that absolute measures like revenue and net income alone do not.
The Overall independent variable is the overall environmental, social, and governance
(ESG) score that a firm received as a rounded sum of its three scores on the main measures of
CSR, the source of which will be addressed in the next section. Technically measuring
unaccounted for ESG risk, a lower score is associated with better performance on each particular
measure and overall, therefore a negative coefficient is expected for a positive correlation
between CSR performance and financial performance.
The next regression is simply breaking the overall score into its composite parts:
Net Margin = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1Environment + 𝛽2Social + 𝛽3Governance + 𝜀
As the overall score is a rounded sum of the Environment, Social, and Governance scores, the
Overall variable must be removed. Each score is a reflection of the unaccounted-for risk arising
from the particular category described. For example, an energy firm is especially exposed to risk
revolving around environmental regulations and would thus have a higher environment score.
Social and governance operate in much the same way, the former reflecting exposure to human
rights violations or controversial issues like animal testing and the latter to the ability of
shareholders to hold executives and firms accountable. Breaking them out allows one to see how
each contributes to the effect of the overall score.
The three final regressions are simply the individual scores by themselves, as seen below:
Net Margin = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1Environment + 𝜀
Net Margin = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1Social + 𝜀
Net Margin = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1Governance + 𝜀
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These regressions allow one to see how the scores affect margins independent of one another as
there is a possibility of overlap among the three measures, for example local air pollution could
be measured as both an environmental risk and a social risk.
In addition to the five regressions just covered, three variants will be run on them in
various combinations. Those variants are including sector dummies, eliminating outliers, and
taking the natural log of Net Margin. The sector dummies include dummy variables for the 11
Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) sectors that represent the firms in the sample and
will be discussed more in depth in the next section (MSCI Inc., n.d.). Outlier elimination involves
removing the top and bottom ten percent of the Net Margin values in the sample set, as some
firms had one-time gains from asset sales or losses from asset purchases or goodwill impairments
that give them artificially high or low net margins for the year in question. Finally, taking the
natural log of Net Margin allows for analysis of whether the effect that ESG scores have on
profitability is more powerful at tighter margins than it is at high ones by measuring the percent
change in net margin.
Data
There were two big pieces of data that needed to be collected for this project, net margins
and CSR measures. Net margins were calculated from annual 10-K reports that publicly traded
companies in the United States file with the Securities and Exchange Commission. While most
firms end their fiscal years on December 31, many do not, instead opting for a fiscal year that
runs from September 30 to September 30, for example. Even then, however, some firms end
fiscal years on random days on the calendar that do not correspond to a calendar quarter or year.
Therefore, because it was nearly impossible to gather the same data for the same timeframe for
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every firm, data was collected from annual reports that corresponded to periods that ended in
2019, regardless of when in the year the report was filed.
For the CSR measures in the form of ESG scores, those were taken from an ESG investment
research firm out of the Netherlands called Sustainalytics via Yahoo Finance. While the actual
reports that Sustainalytics produces for its financial institution clients run into the thousands of
dollars, it provides the headline overall, environment, social, and governance scores on the Yahoo
Finance page for most major corporations for free. Thus, the ESG scores were derived from those
Yahoo Finance entries that included the scores. Unfortunately, 30 of the firms in the S&P 500 did
not have ESG scores on their pages, bringing the sample size from 500 to 470. However, there
does not seem to be any systematic reason for the omissions so there is no reason to believe that
the lack of data for those 30 firms would bias the results in any way.
As briefly mentioned, the firms that would be included in this analysis would be those
that comprise the S&P 500 index as of December 31, 2019. The index was chosen because it is
the most widely tracked collection of stocks in the United States and better represents the
American economy as a whole than the Dow Jones Industrial Average, for example. Additionally,
one of the criteria for inclusion in the S&P 500 is a number of consecutive quarters of positive
net income, automatically screening out younger and newly listed firms like Uber and Lyft that
generate huge losses in favor of mature firms that have relatively stable businesses. Due to the
logistical constraint in terms of time required to collect financial data on 500 firms, only one year
of data was collected.
Along with financial data and CSR measures, the full GICS classification for each firm was
also gathered. GICS groups firms into increasingly more specific categories based on the nature
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of the business it is in. Starting with 11 sectors, firms are then assigned to industry groups,
industries, and subindustries that best describe their business activities. For example, Apple Inc.
is in the Information Technology sector, Technology Hardware & Equipment industry group,
Technology Hardware, Storage & Peripherals industry, and the Technology Hardware, Storage &
Peripherals subindustry. While theoretically possible to include dummy variables all the way
down to the subindustry level, the number of firms in each subindustry is often less than three.
Therefore, the dummies that are included in this paper are sector dummies that break the
dataset into 11 groups.
Results
To start, the descriptive statistics for the datasets are below:

Mean

Median

Standard
Deviation

Overall

24.1

23.0

7.9

7.0

52.0

470

Environmental

6.0

3.8

5.9

0.0

27.7

470

Social

10.5

10.2

4.1

0.6

24.2

470

Governance

7.6

6.9

2.6

3.2

16.4

470

15.28%

-71.86%

173.24%

470

Profit Margin

14.22% 11.80%

Minimum Maximum Observations

And here is the breakdown of the representation seen in the GICS sectors:
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GICS Sectors
Information Technology

66

Industrials

65

Financials

64

Consumer Discretionary

62

Health Care

56

Consumer Staples

32

Real Estate

31

Utilities

27

Energy

25

Materials

23

Communication Services
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40
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70

Below are the outcomes of the first set of baseline regressions with no dummy variables
and all outliers included:
Baseline Regressions

Model 1

Overall

Environmental

Social

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4 Model 5

-0.004***
(-4.25)

-0.006*** -0.006***
(-5.04)
(-5.26)

-0.004*
(-1.90)

-0.003
(-1.47)
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0.003
(1.11)

Governance

R-Squared

0.03

0.06

0.003
(1.07)

0.06

0.00

0.00

(t-statistics), *** = p<0.01, ** = p<0.05, * = p<0.10
The next results are from regressions with the variants discussed above:
Baseline Regressions with Sector Dummies

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5

Overall

0.000
(0.11)

Environmental

0.001
(0.36)

Social

0.002
(1.02)

Governance

-0.005
(-1.45)

R-Squared

0.22

0.22

0.000
(0.16)

0.001
(0.50)

-0.004
(-1.08)

0.22

0.22

0.22
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(t-statistics), *** = p<0.01, ** = p<0.05, * = p<0.10
Baseline Regressions, Outliers Removed

Model 1

Overall

Model 2

Model 4

Model 5

-0.000
(-0.48)

-0.002** -0.002***
(-2.20)
(-2.79)

Environmental

Social

-0.000
(-0.10)

Governance

0.004**
(2.40)

R-Squared

Model 3

0.00

0.04

0.001
(0.95)

0.004***
(3.09)

0.02

0.00

0.02

(t-statistics), *** = p<0.01, ** = p<0.05, * = p<0.10
Baseline Regressions with Sector Dummies, Outliers Removed

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
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0.000
(0.47)

Overall

Environmental

0.001
(0.90)

Social

0.002
(1.37)

Governance

-0.004*
(-1.78)

R-Squared

0.15

0.16

0.001
(0.67)

0.001
(0.83)

-0.002
(-1.18)

0.15

0.15

0.15

(t-statistics), *** = p<0.01, ** = p<0.05, * = p<0.10
Finally, here are the results for regressions run with a natural log on Net Margin:
Log (Net Margin)

Model 1

Overall

Environmental

Model 2

Model 3

-0.002***
(-4.50)

-0.003*** -0.003***
(-5.42)
(-5.61)

Model 4 Model 5
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Social

-0.002*
(-1.75)

Governance

0.001
(0.92)

R-Squared

0.04

0.07

-0.001
(-1.39)

0.001
(0.98)

0.06

0.00

0.00

(t-statistics), *** = p<0.01, ** = p<0.05, * = p<0.10
Log (Net Margin) with Sector Dummies

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5

Overall

0.000
(-0.01)

Environmental

0.001
(0.56)

Social

0.001
(0.98)

Governance

-0.003*
(-1.75)

0.000
(0.28)

0.000
(0.34)

-0.002
(-1.39)
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R-Squared

0.23

0.23

0.23

0.23

0.23

(t-statistics), *** = p<0.01, ** = p<0.05, * = p<0.10
Log (Net Margin) with Sector Dummies, Outliers Removed

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5

Overall

0.000
(0.48)

Environmental

0.001
(0.90)

Social

0.001
(1.34))

Governance

-0.002*
(-1.72)

R-Squared

0.15

0.16

0.000
(0.68)

0.000
(0.82)

-0.001
(-1.13)

0.15

0.15

0.15

(t-statistics), *** = p<0.01, ** = p<0.05, * = p<0.10
Discussion
Taken all together, a few patterns emerge from the results. First, the vast majority of the
predictive power of ESG scores on financial performance appears to be tied to the sector that the
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firm is engaged in. In each of the models without sector dummies, one can find high statistical
significance on the environmental coefficient and the overall coefficient. However, as soon as the
sector dummies are included, the significance disappears, suggesting that it is the sectors and
not the social responsibility that is driving the relationship. Additionally, it appears that there is
a strong correlation between environmental measures and certain sectors. As alluded to earlier,
energy firms in particular are going to have a higher level of environmental risk to manage than
most other firms while information technology firms may have little or even no risk from
environmental factors, as a few of them did have scores of zero.
Furthermore, social and governance issues appear to have no influence of any significance
on measures of profitability, only showing statistical significance a few times across all the
models. Interesting to note is the oftentimes positive coefficient on the governance coefficients,
suggesting that more opaquely run firms that are less accountable to shareholders are more
profitable than shareholder friendly ones. However, the sign does turn negative in the natural
log regressions, indicating that that phenomenon may only hold for firms that are extremely
profitable and thus able to get a long leash from shareholders.
Finally, when looking at the R-Squared values for the models, one sees very little
explained by the ESG scores, if any at all. In these regressions, most of the explanatory power
seems to come from the sector dummies, indicating that it is the line of business that is most
important to a firm’s financial prospects. However, even the sector dummies can only explain a
small fraction of the variation in net margins, meaning there is certainly much more that
determines a firm’s prospects than sectors and ESG scores. Unfortunately, this paper will not
calculate what those coefficients could be, but one can speculate.
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For example, it is likely that sector is sweeping up many of the variables that would play
a large role in determining net margins. Things like number of competitors, patent protections,
ratios of fixed to variable costs, workforce size, and many more are oftentimes highly correlated
within particular industries. Even high levels of regulation that narrow the range of outcomes for
firms are sector specific. Banks, utilities, and communication services would all fit this
description, operating with strict rules on debt and capital ratios for banks and geographic
monopolies and rates set by law in the case of utilities and communication services.
Environmental scores would be highly affected by the sector a firm was in, even in a negative
direction. While oil firms would generally have higher scores due to the nature of their business,
utilities could move toward lower scores depending on the state of regulation in the location in
which they operate. California, for example, is very aggressive in mandating environmental
improvements for its utilities, pushing them to improve their environmental score even if it hurts
their bottom line. Financial harm arising from forced environmental investment would support
the findings of Husted and Salazar, who found that firms engage in CSR in a profit maximizing
way and can do so when they are not coerced (Husted and Salazar 2006, 86). However, when
coercion is involved, firms are unable to maximize both their social responsibility and financial
returns (Husted and Salazar 2006, 87).
Conclusion
Based on the models used in this paper, CSR measures determine very little of a firm’s
net margins. Even when statistical significance was found, oftentimes in the coefficient
measuring the effect of the environmental score, subsequent models including dummy variables
that controlled for a firm’s GICS sector eliminated that significance, indicating that it is instead
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the sector that was driving the significance in the environmental score and pointing to a strong
correlation between the environmental score and certain sectors like energy and utilities.
Therefore, when controlling for sector, very little statistical significance was found for the
relationship between the CSR measures and net margins. Even when not controlling for sector,
environmental scores were the only ones to consistently show strong significance, leaving social
and governance scores with very little predictive influence. One notable exception to that finding,
however, is when taking the natural log of the dependent variable, net margin. While the
governance coefficient had been positive for all other models, it became negative in the
logarithmic model. Initially, it appeared to suggest that opaquely run firms that were less
accountable to shareholders were better performing, albeit without statistical significance.
Instead, the logarithmic model suggests that firms operating on slim margins are better served
by having less governance risk than similarly margined firms with more governance risk. Thus, at
higher margins, shareholders seem more willing to give managers a longer leash as long as they
maintain high returns.
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